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Rhetoric of the Academy: A Pragmatist Approach to Reexamining Individual Experience in Education

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Rhetoric of the Academy: A Pragmatist Approach to Reexamining Individual Experience in Education

by

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Dedication

For my parents, whose love and encouragement made this possible.

Acknowledgements

This project is effectively the culmination of my last 18 years of education. It is also the product of almost 25 years of learning. I briefly make a distinction here because, as this thesis demonstrates, *learning* is something that takes place long before we ever set foot in a classroom, and continues long after formal schooling comes to a close. In reality, though, what we learn in either space fundamentally contributes to the same end: the satisfaction of our innate human curiosity and the cultivation of who we are as individuals. Throughout my educational career, it has been my great privilege to have been inspired by many such individuals, both in person and through the dusty pages of their books.

Of course, this thesis and I myself would be completely different if not for the more special, personal connections that I have been lucky enough to forge in my life thus far. First, I would like to thank my undergraduate professors at Southwestern University: Bob Bednar, David Gaines, Phil Hopkins, Shannon Mariotti, and Eric Selbin. Your guidance and example showed me that there is still a place in academia for the interdisciplinarily-minded scholar. Second, I would like to acknowledge the wonderful friends, both old and new, who I have met throughout this process: Rebecca Borrelli, Victoria Dominguez, Rudy Pett, and David Tomasz, thank you for always being willing to listen to my itinerant musings on education. Third, I would like to thank my reader, Barry Brummett, for agreeing to subject himself to those itinerant musings in thesis-form.

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education or just suggesting new books to read, Scott not only rekindled my love of learning but played an integral role in keeping it alive. This was accomplished in no small part through his classes, in which I was introduced to pragmatist thought and where I found like-minded allies in both John Dewey and Isocrates. Although I have only recently stumbled upon some of the sources and perspectives that my thesis promotes, including the thoughts of these three great minds, their impact on my thinking has nevertheless been profound.

Last, though certainly not least, I would like to thank my parents, Jean and Michael Thomas, who have stood by me all these years. When I was younger, they stood up for me and did everything in their power to make sure I wasn't just getting the best education possible, but the best education *for me*. They have always taken me and my education seriously, even allowing me to homeschool for high school and part of middle school, so that we could travel and I could work at my own pace. That opportunity is one of my fondest memories and most liberating experiences. As I grew up, I learned to take myself and my own thoughts just as seriously as they had. But all along the way, because of their heart and humor, I have also remembered to keep the fun in learning. Mom, Dad, this is for you.

"I have never let my schooling interfere with my education."

–Mark Twain

Abstract

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Higher education is at a crossroads. In the U.S. especially, the question of what role education should play in greater society continues to come up. Should education be about fundamentally developing the predispositions or skills of an individual so that he or she can be a more effective citizen later in life? Or should education merely function as a box to check off, a kind of rite of passage that, regardless of quality or content, is required of an individual on the way to becoming part of some "real world?" These issues are quickly moving to the forefront for students and scholars alike; no longer relegated behind closed doors at faculty meetings, these issues are coming to define the very institutions that question them. It is the goal of this thesis, then, to address these shifting goals for, and horizons of, education through a rhetorical lens. From this perspective, education functions as the text under consideration. Rhetoric as it is understood for the majority of this project can be seen in the social interactions that take place, typically between the individual student and his or her educational environment. The core theme

that runs throughout this thesis is that learning is not something that solely takes place through formal education, nor is it about acquiring mere common sense; rather, it is a natural extension of human curiosity to wonder about and explore the world of which we are all a part. It is the responsibility of schools and universities alike to facilitate students in developing who they are as a part of this bigger picture. To this end, I introduce the term "inhabited learning." Inhabited learning elaborates on why one's learning experience in formal education is still so important: In an age of information we all need some way of making sense of the myriad facts and figures we encounter in our everyday lives, with the hope of being able to make better sense of ourselves in the process.

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Introduction

Higher education is at a crossroads. In the U.S. especially, the question of what role education should play in greater society continues to come up. Should education be about fundamentally developing the predispositions or skills of an individual so that he or she can be a more effective citizen later in life? Or should education merely function as a box to check off, a kind of rite of passage that, regardless of quality or content, is required of an individual on the way to becoming part of some "real world?" While schools involved in the initial stages of education, such as elementary or middle schools, continue to struggle with these questions (especially regarding teaching students what they "need to know" to pass their classes *and* socializing them to the supposed "way things work" after formal education has ended), institutions of higher learning are taking strides toward addressing the growing disparity between the school and society. What's more, these issues are coming to the forefront for students and scholars alike; no longer relegated behind closed doors at faculty meetings, these issues are coming to define the very institutions that question them. A large part of the problem is the age old struggle between theory and practice, which, while it traditionally has played out between academics who prefer one approach to research or study over the other, has more recently spilled over the walls of the college campus and into greater society. A major implication of this development is that as "thinking" and "doing" have continued to be drawn in opposition to one another, interests outside of academia have started to influence the safe space of the ivory tower. Some arguments say this is a good thing; why should professional educators have a monopoly on knowledge, especially in a democratic society

where that knowledge directly equates to power? Other arguments, mainly those coming from individuals within the academy, are discouraged at how outside pressure for funding and abstract learning outcomes have become paramount to imparting valuable skills to students, or pursuing new frontiers of thought through research. In this sense, the college or university campus as a sanctuary for exploring new ideas or testing the social waters before becoming part of the work force has been replaced by the school as a kind of market-driven knowledge industry.

It is the goal of this thesis to address the latter concern about the shifting goals for and horizons of education. While this project does not single out education as "higher" or "lower" in any particular sense, that is done so for a reason: although the different stages of education may focus on teaching particular things to the student, anything that is taught, regardless of *when* it is taught, necessarily modifies the student's life experience. Put another way, how and what students learn, even early on, can have a dramatic impact on not just what but how they continue to learn throughout their lives. The core theme that runs through this thesis, then, is that learning is not something that solely takes place through formal education, nor is it about acquiring mere common sense; rather, learning is a natural extension of human curiosity to wonder about and explore the world of which we are all a part. And it is the responsibility of schools and universities alike to facilitate students in developing who they are as a part of this bigger picture. For the purposes of this project, this is learning.

Unfortunately, this is not enough. Upon closer examination, one begins to realize that the issues and questions currently facing education today are not new; they have been around for years and, in some cases, centuries. Part of the solution, then, might be to

more closely examine education's past in the hopes of better understanding its present situation. The take away here is not to merely import what may have worked in the past into present circumstances, but rather, through the hindsight that we are afforded, *learn* from our past mistakes in the hope of multiplying present successes.

But even this may not be enough. Even if one materializes from the ether a perfect plan for satisfying the demands of academics and greater society by redefining the role of education in this or that way, other individuals may still lack the driving force or impetus for pursuing that program or realizing it completely. This is where rhetoric comes in. Though typically understood by those who do not teach or preach the discipline of rhetoric professionally as rules for speaking properly, or even as a means of impressing friends and colleagues at a cocktail party, rhetoric has the potential to be much more. To start, rhetoric can be understood as persuasion. This is the definition that, when watered down too much, tends to be bent into either of the two previous examples. Those individuals who pursue this simple, truncated iteration of rhetoric are often only concerned with drawing attention to themselves or winning arguments. But as a study of various acts of persuasion, rhetoric can help us to ask more serious questions: What message is an author of a given text trying to get across to his or her readers? What implications does a given text have on a community or society, both in the author's own time but especially in our time? What cultural or societal values are translated or negated through a given text? How can what seems like the densest theory be transformed to direct practical activity?

For this project, education functions as the "text" under consideration. Why do we formalize education as a school or other institution? Should it be the responsibility of the

teacher or student (or both) to ensure that learning in these environments happens "as it ought to?" Who decides how learning "ought to" happen in the first place? Is it something that should be decided during a faculty meeting, by a board of directors, or by the individual student him or herself? And so, while the way a particular author or individual speaks or an audience's reaction to a speech or book will not be directly engaged here, rhetoric still plays what is perhaps a more vital role in sorting out a possible goal for education. Rhetoric as it is understood for the majority of this project can be seen in the social interactions that take place, typically between the individual or student and his or her educational environment. An environment can be any location or situation in which a student has the opportunity to learn, from the home to the school to greater society. The bottom line is that learning cultivates the individual's ability to interact socially, through what he or she reads, talks about with others, or experiences in some other way.

To the end of elaborating on that point, this thesis is divided up into three chapters, all of which address some particular aspect of the function of education in society, why what is going on now will not work, and potential directions to take toward solving those problems. In Chapter 1 I begin where most of the Western world does with inquiries about the nature of thought more generally: that is, with the Greeks. In particular, I focus on the work of the ancient Greek philosopher, sophist, and educator Isocrates, who is often overlooked in favor of more popular minds such as Aristotle or Plato. One reason why Isocrates tends to get overlooked is that very little of his work has been preserved, but that also means that we are able to immerse ourselves in his thoughts, allowing for what I believe is a more personal connection with this philosopher. He also

had a particular concern with education in his own time, one that he tried to address, like Plato, in the creation of a school where Isocrates was able to implement his educational program or *paideia*. Isocrates is relevant from a rhetorical perspective as well, since his *paideia* not only encouraged individual ability, but also began to direct students toward a notion of something greater than themselves, what is often referred to as Isocrates' project of panhellenism. But while Isocrates provides an invaluable starting point for this exploratory study of how rhetoric can redefine education, what I refer to as educative rhetoric, a more modern mind is needed to bring the role of education home regarding its ability to help shape and mitigate more contemporary social concerns.

In Chapter 2, I turn to the work of the American philosopher, educator, and pragmatist John Dewey. Renowned for his work in reforming public education in the U.S., especially in the early part of the 1900s, I see Dewey as expanding on Isocrates' project of panhellenism in order to realize education as an integral part of the complex whole of human experience. Taking the turn of the century and the subsequent turn to modern science as his cue, Dewey proposes that the scientific method offers a way of getting at not only how we describe our experience as human beings, but how we can make the most of such experiences. This is learning for Dewey, where, while each individual has his or her own repertoire of prior experiences that inform a new experience, there are ways of bettering experience in general that are applicable to everyone. In a sense, Dewey envisions learning as something that we as human beings do naturally. The goal of formal education, then, is not to attempt to cram the facts, figures, customs, or traditions of yesterday into the student's mind today; instead, education should be concerned with cultivating individual ability to the point where we can begin to

make the most of our experiences for ourselves, both within the classroom and without. The rhetorical perspective that I believe Dewey offers is that, in becoming more aware of our own experience, we simultaneously realize that our experience is not wholly our own; in fact, it is informed by (as well as informs) the experiences of others with whom we interact in our community. Determining the means of making these interactions more beneficial for ourselves, others, and ultimately our common society becomes the goal of what I define in this chapter as pragmatic rhetoric.

Finally, Chapter 3 asks the following question: While the best learning experiences seem to be the ones where we feel like we bring something new to the table or conversation already in progress, what does our capacity for thinking in new ways mean for things like social change and progress? The take away here is whether or not we can avoid the pitfalls that often stymie change, such as closed-mindedness, in favor of a way of thinking more conducive to rhetorical invention. Understood as how we manipulate and ultimately create our communicative context, rhetorical invention illuminates how language not only affects us and how we perceive ourselves or others, but also how, by transforming our perception of language, we may be able to transform our very society. This chapter also addresses the rift between opposing points of view that often develops in what we might consider any "good" debate today, by examining the nature of dialectic. While dialectic is a popular method of critical analysis among academics, it is introduced here as a component of the everyday arguments that revolve around (or devolve to) one-sided thinking. In such an instance, dialectic often leaves us with more questions than answers, an amalgamation of fragmented viewpoints rather than a more definitive solution or plan for action. I conclude Chapter 3 with a discussion of

one possible path down which education could be redirected, toward what I refer to as inhabited learning. Inhabited learning elaborates on why one's learning experience in formal education is still so valuable, especially today. In an age of information we all need some way of making sense of the myriad facts and figures we encounter with the hope of being able to make better sense of ourselves in the process. And I believe inhabited learning can do just that.

Chapter 1: Reinventing Rhetoric: An Isocratean Approach to Education

This research project will attempt to establish a foundation for talking about the role of rhetoric in shaping education. While the "hows" and "whys" of education certainly seem to be on the minds of most scholars and many students today, I believe that the role rhetoric has to play in this conversation needs to be clarified. I turn to the work of the ancient Greek philosopher and teacher, Isocrates, in order to explore how his contributions shape the question of how best to formulate an educative rhetoric; that is, a rhetoric not concerned with accumulating knowledge or winning arguments, but a rhetoric focused on the integration of that learned knowledge with everyday life. Isocrates' work is an ideal place to start because, unlike the work of many of the figureheads of ancient Greek philosophy such as Plato or Aristotle, Isocrates is typically aligned with the sophists. Though the sophists as a group are often misunderstood, starting with Isocrates allows me to occupy the middle (and as will be seen later, pragmatic) ground between rhetoric and philosophy. The goal here is to demonstrate that even 2,500 years later, the rhetoric of the ancient sophists may in fact have a great deal more value to offer the academy today than academia's traditional perspective of the sophists tends to admit. This is not to say, however, that the rhetorical practices of Isocrates should be imported without modification; rather, I believe that defining Isocrates' insights on civic education, broad learning, and encouraging individual interest and ability as the *means* of education may help to redirect us as scholars to a very important *end* of education: to bridge the gap between theory and practice, between the

academy and greater society. To this end, the work of Isocrates will be used to frame what educative rhetoric as a program of teaching and learning could look like, while I will turn to the work of the pragmatists, especially John Dewey, in Chapter 2 in order to further explore the next logical step: if educative rhetoric is successful, what best practices should the citizen enact in his or her life?

The role of rhetoric in this project will be to locate the junction of theory and practice, where rhetoric will be defined generally as the skills or habits of communication necessary to aid us in practical problem solving in relation with others (practice) through everyday meaning making (theory). While this definition may ultimately prove too broad, it accomplishes the important task of setting the rhetoric of education apart from critical rhetoric or rhetoric as public address. This chapter is divided into five main sections which explore the following: Isocrates' rhetoric, his educational pedagogy, the practice of declamation, the individual's rhetorical training, and the intersection of education and citizenship. But first, some background on Isocrates is necessary.

A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON ISOCRATES

The easiest way to start talking about the rhetoric proposed by Isocrates in his educational program is to distinguish it from what it was *not*. Though often depicted as being caught in the middle between the philosophy of Plato and the rhetoric of the sophists, Isocrates tries to strictly delineate his work. On the one hand, Isocrates' *philosophia*, the perspective on thinking that informs his educational program, or *paideia***,** is not exactly akin to the truth-seeking philosophy of Plato; on the other hand, though unlike the sophists in several ways, Isocrates' teachings still tend to be lumped together

with their work. Yet, rather than hurting Isocrates' educational program, this duality actually helps, especially since it allowed him to draw on the best of what both other worlds and ways of thinking had to offer.

The sophists were perceived as silver-tongued teachers of speech who traveled throughout ancient Greece, making grand promises to the people they encountered. These sophists claimed that they could essentially teach anyone to talk circles around one's fellow citizens, even to the point of counseling one on how to dominate with a weak argument. Of course, the sophists also suffered ill repute for charging a fee for their services (Fredal 2008). Although paying for education is commonplace today, it was unheard of at the time, and looked down upon in ancient Greece. In fact, even in many academic circles today, this negative opinion persists and tends to be cast over all sophists and their practices, including Isocrates. But the real value of the sophists lies in realizing that these practices heralded the institutionalization of education, exemplified in Isocrates' establishment of a school in which he imparted his rhetorical training.

Isocrates further distanced himself from the sophists through his sense of community. According to John Poulakos, "in the case of the Sophists, the primary function of *logos* is critical. In this capacity, it often operates so as to create a crisis by casting doubt on and overthrowing the established realities…In the case of Isocrates, the principal function of *logos* is constructive…Insofar as it can shape social reality, logos works so as to build necessary institutions and create human communities held together by commonly shaped beliefs" (2004, 74). For Isocrates, then, the heart of *logos* (a reasoned opinion or account), was a sensibility to be able to emphasize commonality with others, while also being able to meet them on their own terms. In this way, his

educational practice, his *paideia*, saw its culmination in the everyday cultural interaction between individuals of a community, and "[i]n this context, the identification of rhetoric with 'philosophy' and 'culture' is not only understandable, but essential. Democracy is primarily a form of speech that cannot be spoken by any one person. It can be learned well only amidst many voices" (Hariman 2004, 226-227).

By instilling his students with a sense of community, Isocrates succeeds again in distinguishing himself from the other sophists, who saw the mindless masses as there to be manipulated. But practicing an educational program that emphasized the role of the individual as a member of the community also distanced Isocrates from Plato and the philosophers. As Ekaterina Haskins puts it, "[u]nlike Plato, Isocrates does not condemn the aesthetic dimension of rhetoric. It is not the power of the spoken word he questions, but the unrestrained pursuit of individual gain to the detriment of the collective good of the *demos*, which has become the dominant type of rhetoric in the courts and the assembly" (2004, 92). Isocrates thus presented his rhetoric as something good for the whole, opposed to both the philosophy of Plato, which concerned itself with the possession of wisdom by an elite few, and the rhetoric of the sophists, which was concerned with the power of the individual to mislead or confound the masses.

DEFINING ISOCRATES' RHETORIC

The first major distinction that Isocrates makes in his own educational program is between rhetoric as a science and rhetoric as a kind of inventive endeavor. Isocrates adamantly argued that there cannot and should not be a 'science' of rhetoric, since such a stringent system would rob rhetoric of its creative potential. As Jeffrey Walker puts it,

"Isocrates famously argues against the notion of…an 'ordered art' or 'science' consisting of fixed prescriptive rules, and stresses instead the notion of discourse production as a 'creative act'" (2011, 62). This notion of a creative act significantly delineates Isocrates from the other philosophers or sophists, since it implies a degree of originality of thought, rather than randomly stumbling upon hidden truths in the former case, or learning by heart examples through imitation used to stylistically manipulate others, as is the case for the latter.

Thus the virtue and wisdom which Isocrates imparted through his rhetorical training had its value in its applicability to everyday life; he was not concerned with imparting obscure knowledge, but rather focused on teaching his students to live better. In order to drive this point home, Isocrates established himself in the precarious position between the philosophers and the sophists, the very position that his students would learn to adopt. David Depew and Takis Poulakos explain that "[a] hallmark of Isocratean civic education is that it recast philosophy *as* rhetoric precisely in order to introduce an element of reflective, aesthetic deliberation into the discussion of rhetorical training and practice" (2004, 2). This reflectivity was central to Isocrates' *paideia*, since it required that throughout all their studies, his students be working toward learning to think for themselves in practical situations. The reflective quality of Isocrates' teaching also explains how he was able to borrow from both Plato and the sophists, the great minds of his time, in order to establish his own brand of rhetorical training.

Isocrates suggests that the value of this type of rhetorical training lies in the ability of its teachings to awaken and strengthen the creative capacity of the individual. This capacity can be better understood as one's ability to be discerning both in judging

the discourses of others as well as in producing one's own discourses. Discourse here can be defined simply as communication, the transmission of one's thoughts into words that are exchanged with others. Yet this process is far from simple. In fact, Isocrates makes the following observation:

> [Y]ou will find among those who are unable to create or say anything of value, but are past masters in criticizing and prejudicing the works of others, some who will say that all this is spoken 'prettily' (for they will be too grudging to say 'well'), but that those discourses are better and more profitable which denounce our present mistakes than those which praise our past deeds, and those which counsel us what we ought to do than those which recount ancient history. (*Antidosis*, 221)

Thus, while it may prove difficult, the rewards are great for the individual who learns from the past in order to creatively position him or herself toward the discourses that he or she encounters in the present.

In so doing, the individual becomes a diligent thinker and speaker, flowing effortlessly form one to the other. Isocrates explains that these qualities make up the ideal citizen, one who carefully examines every situation or what is said in any instance, acting in moderation to determine the best possible response or means of engagement. However, even citizen-scholars, as the apogee of public intellectualism, are susceptible to the draw of power so flaunted by the other sophists. The problem then becomes that the scholar may speak of moderation and due diligence in discourse, but in practice he or she no longer heeds his or her own advice. Isocrates echoes this concern, writing that, "we are all so insatiable in discourse that while we prize due measure and affirm that there is

nothing so precious, yet when we think that we have something of importance to say, we throw moderation to the winds, and go on adding point after point until little by little we involve ourselves in utter irrelevancies" (*Antidosis*, 359). The goal of Isocrates' rhetoric, then, is to maintain the precarious balance between thought and action, self and society, past and present experience.

Isocrates accomplishes this in his rhetorical program by giving his educational pedagogy one main end: to teach the individual citizen to become well acquainted with past thoughts and deeds in order to become more attuned to the present moment. The Greeks define this sensibility to time and place as *kairos*. Attunement to *kairos* becomes the goal of Isocrates educational program in rhetoric; as he puts it, "I hold that man to be wise who is able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course, and I hold that man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight" (*Antidosis*, 335). Isocrates' educational program, his *paideia*, is thus concerned with equipping individuals with discerning and steadfast judgment, especially with regard to their communicative interactions.

ISOCRATES' *PAIDEIA*

The most useful way of understanding Isocrates' rhetoric is as a pedagogy with practical purpose. This is contrasted with a rhetoric defined in terms of hard and fast rules of speech to be painstakingly followed, or methods for manipulating the unaware. From this particular perspective, "Isocrates is anything but a Sophist. He demands reflection and deliberative choice, not unthinking response" (Depew & Poulakos 2004, 9). Seen here is the common thread of the importance of individuality that runs through Isocrates'

paideia. This is not, however, to be confused or confounded with a stubborn individualism, in which all people are little more than a fragmented humanity, disparate parts almost entirely isolated from one another; instead, Isocrates emphasizes the individual for the very purpose of putting the pieces back together. In order to succeed at this purpose, Isocrates writes that the individual "must, first of all, have a natural aptitude for that which they have elected to do; secondly, they must submit to training and master the knowledge of their particular subject, whatever it may be in each case; and, finally, they must become versed and practiced in the use and application of their art" (*Antidosis*, 293). In this way, Isocrates teaches individuals to appreciate the unique qualities in themselves, their own ways of thinking and acting in the world, in order to better appreciate the particular qualities and potential contributions of others.

Interestingly enough, the need for a connection between theory and practice proposed in Isocrates' educational program is still very much a salient topic for education today. The current debate in academia between theory and practice seems like a relatively new occurrence, especially given the changing needs of schools. The reality, however, is that we continue to struggle with the same questions about theory and practice that Isocrates encountered in his day. Isocrates, however, proposed that theory and practice be brought together in the following way. He writes of the teachers in his own school that they "set [students] at exercises, habituate them to work, and require them to combine in practice the particular things which they have learned, in order that they may grasp them more firmly and bring their theories into closer touch with the occasions for applying them" (*Antidosis*, 291). Ideally, then, theory and practice should work in harmony.

Yet the connection between these two aspects of education that Isocrates strives for continues to elude scholars today. Steven Mailloux writes that, "What has become central in contemporary debates over critical theory, political philosophy, and educational policy are the questions of whether there are any necessary political consequences to rhetoric or pragmatism or sophistry and whether the structural or constitutive bonds between rhetorical pragmatism and cultural politics have any specific ideological content" (1995, 16). Or, as Josiah Ober puts it, the issue at hand is "the problematic unity of theory and practice, the question of what purchase philosophy broadly conceived might have on how we (as the subjects and objects of rhetorical practice) do and should act in the real world" (2004, 39). Thus the take away from the Isocratean approach to theory and practice is that, in order to be truly useful, one's learning should not merely be connected to the ends of classroom study; instead, learning should flow freely between theory and practice, allowing what one learns in the classroom to impact what one learns out in the real world and vice versa. The school and the community not only should be, but need to be connected for Isocrates. As Edward Schiappa explains, "[Isocrates] advocated an active role in the *polis* through which wisdom is put to the service of the common good, and that is what he and his students did their best to do" (1995, 55). However, while the Isocratean approach to education may seem a bit too idyllic for more critical academic veterans today, that is no reason to just cast it aside. Yet a multitude of voices may still arise asking what worth a 2,500 year old educational program has today. But Isocrates would remind us that we will never know for sure unless we first hear what it has to say. While many scholars rail against the decay of education, they fail to commit themselves to even listening to any new proposed path of action for fear of the change it

might bring. As Isocrates shows, the past is directly implicated in any attempt to improve the present or even the future. His inclusion of the practice of declamation in his rhetorical training further shows how the past and present should always be working together in education.

THE INTERDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE OF DECLAMATION

The next question is how this new educative rhetoric, built upon the foundations of Isocrates' educational program, should work. Isocrates emphasizes the need for students to be familiar with multiple exemplary discourses, to both be exposed to them but also to learn from them what works best. In order to obtain this broad familiarity with various educated thoughts, "the student must read widely and critically in the 'celebrated' authors, a list that would come to include not only poets and sophists but also orators, historians, and philosophers. This work is part of the dual project of cultivating character by expanding the student's intellectual horizon and learning the *ideai*, the fundamental elements of rhetoric" (Walker 2011, 73). Thus Isocrates' *paideia* focused heavily around an interdisciplinary notion of education. It was only by seeing the connections between great thinkers of the past that students could hope to make connections for themselves.

To this end, Isocrates' *paideia* began with students familiarizing themselves with the works of great authors. This was not in an attempt to encourage students to copy directly what had come before, but rather to establish in their minds examples of best practices. These *ideai* would eventually be used by the students to inform, but not define, their own opinions and ways of seeing the world, their *doxa*. Takis Poulakos writes that, "Unlike the Sophists, who had addressed the question of how an orator might best define

or undermine a given *doxa*, Isocrates bracketed persuasion and focused instead on the issue of formulating the best *doxa* possible" (2004, 53). In order to better understand Isocrates' rhetoric today, notions of persuasion and public address as the core of rhetoric need to be set aside. In fact, Isocrates may have been advocating for a kind of education in rhetoric more akin to what we most often practice today, rhetoric as reasoned competence and measured perspective in communication. It is this kind of rhetoric that I consider to be educative, where rhetoric takes on the role of a tool used to enhance one's dexterity in thinking and in deliberation.

Isocrates' educative rhetoric works in the following way. According to Walker, "Beyond this preliminary getting 'familiar/ experienced' with the *ideai*, there is, as Isocrates says, a second, and crucial, stage of training in which the student practices 'selecting' which *ideai* should be used for particular 'cases' (*pragmata*, 'actions/ affairs')" (2011, 74). These first stages of rhetorical training can be summed up in the practice of declamation, where students would practice reading aloud ancient speeches in an effort to get a better sense of the particular *kairos* with which each was imbued. This practice also helped Isocrates' students to then complete the third stage of their education, in which students began to incorporate their own originality into the various *ideai* that they had learned. It was when all of these pieces came together that Isocrates' *paideia* could really be said to work, insofar as the individual scholar had become more attuned to *kairos*. In this way, "Isocrates could cast political deliberation as a process of aiming at the right course of action in the face of uncertainty, and *doxa* as a conjecture aimed at making the right decision" (T. Poulakos 2004, 52). In essence, then, the *ideai* taught by Isocrates and the *doxa* developed by his students had a twofold benefit: first, for the

individual's own competency; second, for the greater thought of the community, where the influence of one was always flowing into the other, from the individual into the established, traditional thoughts of the community and back again.

THE INDIVIDUAL IN RHETORICAL TRAINING

Once they learn what constitutes the theories or methods of rhetoric, students reflect on what they learn in given practical situations in order to inform their own sense of *kairos*. The goal of this part of Isocrates' *paideia* is to "enable a better grip on the present by bringing onto a given situation the full weight of perceptiveness and insightfulness that had been accumulated over time. Experience with the past increased the awareness of possible outcomes in the future; it enabled one to look beyond the immediate situation, explore in advance all potential avenues, and anticipate how events might turn out" (T. Poulakos 2004, 54). Again, this translates into ideas like interdisciplinarity today, where Isocrates' "notion of rhetorical invention as a 'creative process' that involves selecting and combining *ideai* to meet the needs of particular occasions suggests that he regards genres as mixable and malleable" (Walker 2011, 94). It is then up to the individual to decide how those various *ideai* are mixed and matched in order to establish the best possible educational structure given his or her particular disposition

In a sense, Isocrates' *paideia* is not about imparting a fully-fleshed out prescription of educative knowledge. Rather, it functions as a framework which is molded to the person and personality of the individual student. Thus, "*Paideia* can only work with and improve what exists already, and what exists already sets the limits of

what can be achieved. But in those with the right aspirations and a proper work ethic, even with small talent, a great deal can be achieved" (Walker 2011, 122). It is incorrect to assume, then, that Isocrates' *paideia* is a kind of free-for-all in which the students take to their studies on a whim. *Paideia* is, at least for Isocrates, about providing a structure that is flexible enough for those students who have the wherewithal and sense of self to recognize how that particular educational program can work not only for *them*, but *through* them; they are the key to completing the educative process.

The student assents to enter into an agreement with the teacher in which the experiences of both play a crucial role in Isocrates' educative rhetoric. Rather than the teacher simply telling the students how to act, the teacher presents the students with examples through which the students figure out how best to act for themselves. That is, "in civic education the successful reproduction of the teacher's instruction cannot occur without being somewhat different from the teacher's own example…Because a process of literal imitation is not useful, students have to not only acquire expertise but also learn to use it according to the standards of opportunity, propriety, and originality, which in turn are resources for civic leadership" (Hariman 2004, 223). In this way, the interdisciplinarity inherent in Isocrates' rhetorical training not only equips the student to deal with the multiple perspectives present in formal educational settings, but also the myriad opinions and points of view that he or she will encounter in greater society.

EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP

In general, education can, and in many instances does, function as an end in itself. But Isocrates' educational program offers much more. As a civic education which views

individuals as active political agents in society, Isocrates' rhetorical training functions at two levels. First, it positions the individual as an important part of a greater political community. Second, it emphasizes the creative capacity of human beings to transform the political landscape, both on a micro level in terms of how they think about politics, and at a more macro level in terms of how they approach the political conduct of their societies. To the end of better understanding where Isocrates is coming from with his approach to a civic education that spans both society and the classroom, some brief historical context may be useful.

The ancient Athens of Isocrates was one in which democracy had but only recently been instituted. This new form of government began to suggest that the people should play a role in political life, though the degree of participation was still somewhat restricted. However, democracy nevertheless put a spotlight on the value of a citizen's words and deeds, hopefully directed by well-reasoned thought. That is, "[t]he growing democracy made knowledge claims valuable to the citizen as well as to the scholar" (Mailloux 1995, 5). It became a crucial goal of Isocrates' education, then, to mold students who could benefit society. Isocrates also addressed the role of the people in democracy more directly through his project of panhellenism. After years of infighting among the various Greek city states, Isocrates believed the only way to restore Greece to its former glory was for everyone to essentially learn to get along. This went beyond merely tolerating the other city states and emphasized a genuine appreciation of the common Greek culture shared by all. As Poulakos writes, "Isocrates found himself in a dispersed culture, one plagued with the ills inherent in excessive individuation—conflicting claims and competing interests. His reaction to this state of affairs manifested

itself in a rhetoric pointing away from the periphery and towards a center" (2004, 82). Today, this perspective can be taken by scholars in academia, especially rhetoricians, to direct the goal of their teaching back toward affecting change in the 'real world,' while simultaneously realizing that, in so doing, their work is just as real.

It was not merely enough for Isocrates to teach individuals that they are an important part of a larger community. The goal of his *paideia* was to make them better citizens by making them more *active* citizens. The rhetoric that Isocrates taught, then, was not one of preparing speeches for the Athenian assembly nor drawing up lengthy defenses in the courts of law; rather, Isocrates set before himself the project of "[m]aking students wise, in the sense of enabling them to direct the *polis* to new possibilities of human progress" (T. Poulakos 2004, 61). The wisdom in this approach to civic life lies in how it empowers and incorporates all individuals as part of the process of political change. Yet Isocrates does not seem to believe worthwhile change can or should be accomplished through merely struggling up the ladder of political power or stooping to manipulation; instead, he advocates for political action on the individual's own terms. The individual thus creates a kind of political sphere of his or her own from which to act out into the greater political landscape of the community. According to Depew and Poulakos, "if it were possible to participate in the affairs of the *polis* by taking a step back and by distancing oneself from the assembly, then we must also see that distance and that step as the creation of a new space that transformed political deliberation proper—and, as a result, put in place alternative notions of civic education" (Depew & Poulakos 2004, 6). The take away here is that Isocrates' program of civic education taught individuals to be unafraid to remake politics as a source of strength and unity, not weakness and division.

A similar lesson can be applied to the role of rhetoric in political action, where rhetoric can function as an effective means of bringing about change rather than a means of covering up or glazing over the real issues at hand. For rhetoric in particular, where much of what we encounter or do in our everyday lives is defined as political in some way, how to be more aware amidst a cacophony of political discussion and deliberation becomes essential. One might wonder how individuals can acquire the necessary resources that are needed in order to be critical actors in their society: in a word, education. Isocrates' *paideia* cultivates in students the resources to enunciate virtue when tyrants or institutions of myriad sorts work so vehemently against the individual specifically or against any kind of change more generally. This is the practice that Isocratean rhetoric builds toward through its theory. Isocrates explains that the individuals who see this process through, from studentship to citizenship, will "never speak without weighing their words, and so are less often in error as to a course of action" (*Antidosis*, 347). In terms of political action, then, the student of rhetoric is one who does not just make a show of being engaged in the political world or bemoans the loss of some "true" politics; rather, he or she is one who exercises critical judgment through a well-reasoned perspective.

While this first quality of Isocrates' ideal citizen parallels what rhetorical studies tries to do today, there is another quality that begins to mark Isocrates' departure from more traditional ways of thinking about rhetoric: the idea that the virtuous student has a duty to also be a moral citizen. That is, while "Isocrates is certainly capable of distinguishing between political success and moral worth…the unity of philosophy and civic virtue, mind and soul, and speech and thought in his writing suggests that Isocrates

would attribute unsound discourse to unsound intellect…Isocrates believes that moral and intellectual development are closely linked; training his students to think/ speak nobly encourages them to *be* noble" (Schiappa 1995, 47). The politically engaged citizen is one who acts with a sense of noble purpose. The focus here is not that Isocrates advocates training elites who believe themselves better than their fellow citizens; he instead thinks that the ends of education should be teaching and empowering individuals to be unafraid to appreciate their own power in affecting the world around them. In so doing, the citizen not only learns to better understand and exercise his or her own power, but also learns to arouse the potential for action that he or she sees in others.

Both well-reasoned action and a driving moral purpose lay the foundation for what is ultimately Isocrates' civic education. The value found in that program for the politics of today is that it can give us pause amidst a flurry of uncritical speech where anyone thinks that their voice carries the banner of truth. Even among socially engaged academics, the "first citizens" of societal change, it is often all too easy to lend an ear to those discourses which they favor most without giving heed to any other thoughts that may differ from, let alone contradict, their own. As citizens, academics can also fail to live up to their responsibility when they put the majority of their efforts into criticizing those who put forward new ideas simply because they either cannot come up with any themselves, or because they are too afraid to enact change. Lastly, these citizen-scholars may follow the theory of Isocrates' rhetoric to the letter, but throw due measure to the winds for the sake of hearing their own voices above all others. Thus, while Isocrates emphasizes the role of the individual in politics today, he does not raise it on a pedestal; instead, his *paideia* teaches us that all individuals should be valued, just as the student

should learn to keep his or her mind open to multiple ways of seeing and acting politically in the world. As Haskins puts it, "Isocrates' rhetoric is not locked into a predetermined political path, but constitutes the condition of possibility for an ongoing pluralistic democracy" (2004, 90). The goal of Isocrates' civic education, then, is to encourage the ability of his students to arrive at the most sound course of action, to form the best possible habits both as a scholar and as part of a greater community.

COUNTERCLAIMS AND CONCLUSIONS

Though I have spent the majority of this chapter defending the value of Isocrates' *paideia* as a model for an education that is practically oriented, his philosophy is not without its drawbacks. While it is easy enough to accept Isocrates' teachings at face value as the means to encourage civic mindedness in the classroom, that same goal can potentially run into some problems, especially as its implementation is followed through on after formal education ends. What can arise is what Kathryn Morgan refers to as a kind of inconsistency. This inconsistency creeps up in a few ways in the Isocratean *paideia*; for example there is not always parsimony between his theory, and his own practice as a rhetorician or philosopher. Morgan writes that, "in spite of his breadth of vision, Isocrates' educational project is undermined by his engagement with the very rhetoric to which he owes his success…he himself is a product of the city's education in Athenian culture" (2004, 146). That is, although it is easy to see how Isocrates is encouraging "good" rhetoric that will somehow turn society around, he himself cannot help being a part of that society and its aims in the first place. While this does not mean that Isocrates is simply writing for his own renown, it is worthwhile to caution that a

large part of his program as a philosopher trying to find a place for rhetoric is to convince people that his way is somehow better than what is already out there. As Morgan puts it, "I believe that we cannot so easily rid ourselves of the tension between consistency and opportunism, for this is a tension that lies at the heart of Isocrates' educational mission" (2004, 150).

Another way in which inconsistency may be a factor in Isocrates' *paideia* is with regard to its "audience," the students or people of Athens. There are moments where as good as what Isocrates has to say may sound, it seems difficult to execute an educational program based around cultivating the abilities inherent in every individual student; how can mass education possibly work for such a diverse group? Morgan suggests that, "By personalizing the city, [Isocrates] makes it easier to apply to it personal principles, to treat it as a single entity with which he can enter into an educational relationship. The model enables him to sidestep a potential problem in applying his ideal of consistency, that one cannot educate the mass of citizens the way one can a private pupil" (2004, 139). While the group may be diverse, however, Isocrates acknowledges that its members face a common problem: namely that culture or society which they hold in common. This is not to suggest that commonality itself is the problem (after all, this is precisely what Isocrates is working toward through his project of panhellenism), but rather there are better and worse kinds of association. For Isocrates, then, "The crowd is cast as the most important educator of the young. Since it is the teacher, it is also the corruptor. The crowd, however, cannot be a philosopher and will always disapprove of philosophy" (Morgan 2004, 130). This is why teachers like Isocrates are needed, to reeducate the populace away from their traditional ways of thinking about the world and how they interact in it.

However, there seems to be one final inconsistency in the role of the teacher here. What place does the teacher have in a society where individuals are governed by society and accordingly act as they ought to? That is, if each individual looks after him or herself and carries that appreciation out with them into the world, what use is there for a teacher in a society that effectively learns to maintain its own right course of development? Morgan suggests that "Although it would have been easy for Plato and Isocrates to assert that their perceived unpopularity was a simple matter of unschooled ignorance, they do not exercise this option. Instead they magnify their problem by suggesting that people have been *educated* into ignorance and prejudice against them" (2004, 133). Here, Isocrates seems to be undermining his very own position as a teacher or expert who can help get society back on track. But I think the key take away is that, even if a self-regulating society of mindful, rational citizens is the endgame, there is little chance of achieving that end without a teacher to get the ball rolling or education to catalyze that process in the first place.

Aside from potential inconsistency between Isocrates' own theory and practice, one other issue may arise in trying to wholeheartedly implement his work as an effective educational program. Eugene Garver explains that this other distinction may be seen in how rhetoric as it is defined for the teacher does not totally map onto rhetoric as it should be practiced by the citizen. He writes that, "The Sophists were torn between two concepts of rhetoric, a neutral one which they, as specialists, were uniquely prepared to teach, and a culturally constitutive one that is the property of all citizens" (2004, 188). Thus, while the rhetoric which Isocrates professes is supposed to be the kind of thing that everyone can practice, there are certain people who need to keep the good rhetorical society on

track. Garver further problematizes this point, asking "How are a generally shared competence and a particular expertise compatible? How can something both be useful for a variety of purposes, and also contain its own ends and values, or at least be oriented to good social ends?" (2004, 188). That is, how can an educational program meant to transform society lie in the hands of a few select individuals? In the first instance, rhetoric is seen as having the ability to change social life for the better by making the individuals who make up that society into better citizens. In the second instance, the program seems to dictate that a very particular kind of person has to be the one to open the eyes of the many and suggest a program of educative rhetoric in the first place. In the latter case, rhetoric is seen as an end in itself, a tool for teaching; in the former case, rhetoric is a means to some greater social good. But as Garver puts it "for Isocrates the instrumental and the civilizing aspects of rhetoric coexist, and a practical art of rhetoric exists, when doing well and speaking well are identical" (2004, 189). That is, while these two aspects of Isocrates' *paideia* may be useful taken on their own, they are most effective when taken in concert.

The fact that these issues may arise is evidence for why Isocrates alone cannot "solve" the question of rhetoric and education for us today. This is not to downplay the relevance of Isocrates' thought, however. Even years after his time, great rhetoricians have continued to turn their attention toward the question of education. For example, the great Roman orator Quintilian built upon Isocrates' work. Though Quintilian did not attribute as much significance as Isocrates did to individual ability, Quintilian did emphasize how critical it was for the teacher to know how to impart the right kind of knowledge to pupils as future citizens. To do this, Quintilian proposed an approach to

teaching that strived to achieve what he saw as the end of all education: moral virtue (the relationship between education and morality will be explored further in the next chapter). Richard Lanham has described this notion as "The Q Question" of rhetoric and education, which asks "Is the perfect orator…a good man as well as a good orator?" (1993, 155). According to Lanham, how one goes about answering this question fundamentally changes the role rhetoric can play in the educative process.

The idea that rhetoric has some part to play in the moral well-being of the community, then, certainly did not just disappear after Isocrates' time. While Quintilian was also unable to "solve" the Q Question of his own time, he still made important strides toward driving home the important role that rhetoric has in cultivating the good citizen. Donald Clark explains that "[t]raining in rhetoric cannot alone, or with other educational helps, make a youth prudent, temperate, courageous, and just, but it fails in its traditional educational duty if it does not throw its weight in favor of these cardinal virtues. Teachers may be assured that some measure of success will follow" (1957, 265). By adapting educative rhetoric to the needs of future citizens in the present, Quintilian seems to suggest, along with Isocrates, that those individuals will be prepared to determine the best course of action for their society. As Clark puts it, "The traditional and still valid justification is that free discussion by speakers and writers will enable the citizens to discover those probabilities most likely to be near the truth and by 'the powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course,' as Isocrates put it" (1957, 265). For both Quintilian and Isocrates, then, part of the answer to redefining educative rhetoric lay in shifting its focus from a content-oriented program to a program that is skills-oriented.

Fortunately, the work of John Dewey will serve to further illuminate this point from a more modern perspective.

Chapter 2: Cultivating Communication through Associated Living: Deweyean Pragmatism and Societal Learning

Educative rhetoric plays a pivotal role in shaping an individual's learning experience in more traditional education, yet it is the first step in a two-part program. As chapter one shows, the first part of this rhetorical program involves strengthening individual abilities, an emphasis that is evidenced in even the earliest work on rhetoric, such as Isocrates' writings. This is the responsibility of educative rhetoric, where an educational program is built around the needs and predispositions of the individual student. Put another way, the rhetorical focus here is on personal problem solving skills for negotiating meaning from a first-person perspective. While educative rhetoric does point toward the individual as part of a greater whole (especially as seen in Isocrates' project of panhellenism), the focus of ancient educative rhetoric remains on the student as a singular citizen. And so, the second part of this program involves actually transferring those individual ways of perceiving and thinking to the world beyond the classroom. Here, the developmental component of educative rhetoric can be realized as part of a greater communal whole, understood through the more social component supplied by pragmatic rhetoric. While a great deal of work has been done on pragmatism, rhetoric, and other facets of communication (Crick 2004, Danisch 2007, Stob 2011), there still seems to be a niche to be filled with regard to rhetoric's relationship to pragmatism and education. Thus, the responsibility of pragmatic rhetoric for this project is to insure that those individuals whose minds and abilities are cultivated through their experiences in formal education follow through in that process, which entails carrying over the skills

learned in school to the rest of society. In this way, the individual becomes a more effective citizen of the society of which he or she is an integral part.

To this end, I look to the work of John Dewey in order to better understand how to connect the kind of learning that takes place in formal education with the learning that comes from practical activity engaged in by the citizens of a society in order to foster social progress and innovation. Dewey is uniquely situated to address these concerns for several reasons, put best by Larry Hickman, who writes that,

> Because of his rich treatment of concepts and hypotheses as instrumental, his insistence that there is a commonality of human life and that our understanding of it is grounded in the biological and anthropological sciences, and his commitment to a hard-headed notion of referentiality, Dewey's American, broadly-experimentalist philosophy avoids some of the central problems of both the Anglo-American analytic tradition and French-inspired postmodernism (and its neo-pragmatist American cousins). Why is this approach to philosophy distinctively American? The answer to this question lies in its treatment of concepts as instruments that are malleable, but not infinitely so…and in its commitment to the hands-on, rough-and-tumble engagement with stubborn facts, especially those having to do with social problems, in ways that treat analysis as but one phase of concrete problem solving and not as an enterprise sufficient unto itself…and in its insistence on a philosophy that is democratic in its methods and outlook because it is committed to a pedagogy that lies at the heart of democratic life and the continual reform of democratic institutions. (2009, 2)

Thus, Dewey's approach encourages an encounter with the real world informed by an understanding that what we tend to think of as educational life and real life are actually part of the same continuous experience. The antithesis to this point typically has been to suggest an age-old demarcation between life of the mind and "real life." But I hope to show that, when enacted properly, the learning experience does not have to simply be about one or the other. What I propose instead is the two-phase approach to a continued learning experience, to which I briefly alluded above. To put it simply, Isocrates instructs how to make educative experience practical for the individual, while Dewey demonstrates through pragmatic rhetoric how practical experience can be educative for all of an individual's relationships in and to society. This chapter will be divided into five main sections, all concerned with parsing out some aspect of pragmatic rhetoric as it pertains to realizing the potential of citizens and their society in an effort to get at the most effective communication possible. These sections include a brief background on Dewey and his pragmatist point of view, an overview of how formal education can be separated from social life, the kind of learning environment needed to foster growth, the development of habits of reflective inquiry, and finally the melioristic relationship that can when learning is understood as both the ends *and* means to something more. But first, some brief background will be given on Dewey and the social context that defines his perspective, as an educator and a pragmatist, and the value that a rhetorical reading can have when it comes to shedding a little light on the sometimes dark and dusty relationship between the school and society.

JOHN DEWEY, PRAGMATISM, AND EXPERIENTIAL ENCOUNTERS

Like my incorporation of Isocrates into the first part of this study, I turn to Dewey because, despite his having lived and inhabited a world separated from our own, the issues he faced concerning the role of education in society as well as his ideas to combat those issues still ring incredibly clear today. Turning his attention to focus on education in the early 1900s, Dewey found himself in a society fraught with insecurity; in an increasingly industrialized age, the traditions and customs of yesterday no longer sufficed in a 20th century world. While industrialization brought with it numerous changes to the social landscape of how individuals interact with and relate to their communities, Dewey may be said to be predominantly concerned with two aspects in particular. First, there resulted a kind of cultural apathy from this fast-paced way of living. The world became a quantifiable one rather than a qualitative one, where producing more quickly came to outweigh producing higher quality; as society shifted toward a concern with economic exchange, social exchange seemingly suffered. Second, society came to be dominated by a language and consequent culture of generalizations, wherein it was more often than not easy to lose minute or complex glimmers of self or identity in the shuffle of the masses.

But the greatest challenge to the ways of the past lay in the rise of modern science. Since the mid-1800s, modern science had come into its own as a method for empirically documenting the natural phenomena of the world. Dewey came to perceive in the scientific method a means of rooting out the more ossified beliefs and practices in many areas of society, but education seemed especially in need of some kind of reconstruction. Rather than taking traditional knowledge about how education should work as his starting point, Dewey elects to use an approach that looks to nature and how

we engage with and encounter it. Put another way, Dewey starts with the interactions that we human beings have with our world and one another. However, this is not to suggest that somehow importing or forcing the subject matter of the sciences on education as a whole was the answer; rather, Dewey thought that the kind of objectivity offered by the scientific method might provide a strong starting point from which the problems with formal education could start to be seriously addressed. What's more, Dewey believed this endeavor was paramount, since he saw education as the key to a successful transformation of society.

Taking a cue from modern science, Dewey began his inquiry into the relationship between society and education at the level of the experience. That is, "Dewey took his point of departure in interactions taking place in nature, where nature is itself understood as a 'moving whole of interacting parts'" (Biesta 1994, 10). This notion lies at the heart of Dewey's pragmatism, a philosophical perspective which essentially looks at the interactions that occur in the world and postulates about their potential effects, both for the present and also for the future. This way of thinking about the world translates over to the interactions between human beings as well. Yet, unlike Isocrates, Dewey would not suggest that we as individuals come to our environment with everything we need to make the most of what we encounter.

The qualities that Dewey does grant human beings at the outset function more as starting points from which our understanding grows as we act or react toward something encountered in our environment. That is, "[w]e do not need to have information about 'the world' before we can act in it. As living organisms, we simply are always already active; we simply are always already in transaction with our environment. This does not

mean, of course, that we do not learn as a result of our transactions with the world. The whole idea of experience is precisely that we undergo the consequences of our 'doings' and that we change as a result of this" (Biesta 1997, 14). These various "doings" are what make up our individual experiences. For Dewey, an experience is not merely some isolated event or series of events; rather, our experience is always in flux, always modifying or being modified by another more immediate experience. In fact, "[t]he inclusive and integrative nature of Dewey's notion of experience is better captured by the word 'life'…Experience reveals a practical arena, an objective world modifying and being partly modified by human actions and sufferings. Experience includes customs, institutions, disease, knowledge, death, potentialities, victories, defeats, etc." (Pappas 1997a, 533). This is why I believe that Dewey's experiential method can serve as the foundation for pragmatic rhetoric, because rhetoric is concerned with understanding the very particular motivations for why and how we as human beings act and interact in and with the world.

For Dewey, while having any kind of experience affects us, determining *how* that experience affects us can help us enhance the quality of that and future experiences. To this end, I slightly modify Dewey's understanding of experience by introducing the term "experiential-encounter" in order to focus on the actual exchange that takes place in a given interaction among individuals, others, and society. Understanding Dewey's pragmatic notion of experience in this way reveals the truly complex and interwoven nature of all the different entities that impact and make up each of our unique experiences. Put another way, our experiences are the result of various particularities coming together to interact in a given place or time.

Consequently, this means that the experiential-encounter is not something that can be defined in advance for every individual in every situation. But while the outcome of this encounter may certainly be different for each individual, the everyday act of experiencing that takes place is common to anyone; a different life story may be told to, or more appropriately by, different individuals, but those stories are but chapters to a greater human story being simultaneous shared and created. As Pappas puts it, "The direct materials of first-hand experience are meanings that might be conditioned by our history. Nevertheless, they are immediately present (given) in the form of qualities and relations…They are testable and subject to revision and correction by further inquiry. In other words, experience as method relies on what is experienced, but what is experienced not only changes but can be modified and improved by the same method" (1997a, 525). While the experiential-encounter may hold some particular value on its own, the greater value is only realized when we begin to consider the interconnections and potentialities for meaning that make such an individual experience and future experiences possible.

Pragmatists tend to see the individual as being crucial to pragmatism's success, especially insofar as more pragmatic experience-valuing individuals make for a more pragmatic community. Of course, this distinction of the individual from "society" has caused countless discussions and disagreements about the role of the individual versus the role of the group, or personal freedom versus the well-being of the greater good. Yet pragmatism itself may provide the very solution (or perhaps more accurately, dissolution) to this precarious balancing act between the individual and society, which so much of education seems caught up in today.

Thus, the pragmatic goal of helping individuals make better connections in their everyday lives requires something more. It requires more structure than would be found in the personal preferences of an individual but also not so much structure as to fall prey to being potentially smothered by the educational institution. An overall framework is also needed to buffer this project against being disregarded as overly relativistic, a perspective which would reduce the quality of learning from being "something for everybody" to being "anything for anybody." As Kosnoski puts it, "As individuals begin to evaluate arguments in the context of a 'wider span of particularities,'…they become more likely to sympathize with their fellow deliberators' expressions and use this "enlarged mentality" when constructing deliberative solutions… although increased sympathy does not automatically negate real differences in interest, it can, when coupled with rhythmically generated interest in conversation, motivate participation in deliberations that might otherwise flounder in the face of confusion and disagreement (2005, 664). A solution, then, may lie at the very pragmatic point that exists between the individual and the community. But it is first necessary to develop a greater understanding of the relationship that parallels that of the individual and community; that is, the relationship of the school to society in terms of the school's isolation from social life.

THE SCHOOL'S ISOLATION FROM SOCIAL LIFE

Dewey suggests that three main concerns arise from the school's isolation from everyday experience: "(1) subject matter and practical living become separated, each being treated as though it were an entity; (2) then the subject matter tends to become superficial, with no correspondence to life situations; (3) until finally the subject matter

becomes so remote that there is not even the possibility of applying it to our living" (1973, 192). The great problem here is that, though typically drawn in opposition to one another, the resources of the school can often be invaluable in addressing the needs of society, and vice versa. And this problem is not a uniquely American one. Even in his lectures in China, Dewey asks, "How many times do we witness the spectacle of things being emphasized in the school long after they have ceased to be relevant to social needs. And, conversely, how often is it the case that something sorely needed by society it totally neglected by schools" (1973, 186-187). Consequently, part of the answer to this problem by many Chinese activists was to embrace the usage of *Paihua*, a vernacular language that made important discussion about politics or education more open to the general public (Dewey 1973, 6). In addition, *Paihua* also mirrors the concept of *paideia* introduced by Isocrates in chapter one. In both instances, in order to establish better schools and a better society, the first step is to realize that the two are inherently linked and are dependent upon one another.

Unfortunately, education as ordinarily practiced often fails to encourage the kind of learning needed to facilitate *lifelong* learning; it fails to emphasize the value of that learning as not only an experience in itself that is useful to the individual while still in school, but also as a resource which an individual can draw upon in his or her future experiences. This can happen in a few ways: generally not converting knowledge learned in school to learning outside the classroom; not considering students' predispositions to learning material; or focusing only on artificial ends like exams or grades. In each case, formal education somehow alienates students from the activity of learning and consequently from themselves. The act of learning is then jettisoned into the realm of

abstract social relations, losing any trace of the source of meaning for the student and his or her unique sense of self. But David Downing notes that, even with regard to the individual self, "Dewey understood that a 'student' was always socialized and acculturated such that individual 'interests' were not merely idiosyncratic differences" (1995, 189). Thus the separation imposed to delineate between the school and society is merely an artificial one; the reality is that an individual is always being shaped by what or whom he or she encounters in either world.

In the worst case scenario, then, Dewey explains that "It is possible for the mind to develop interest in a routine or mechanical procedure if conditions are continually supplied which demand that mode of operation and preclude any other sort…the mind, shut out from worthy employ and missing the taste of adequate performance, comes down to the level of that which is left to it to know and do, and perforce takes an interest in a cabined and cramped experience" (2010, 28). First and foremost, this is problematic because it seems to dehumanize the individual, considering people to be just as homogenous as the products that they produce. But secondly, this point emphasizes how critical the peculiar human component is to the process of education and, through what we do with what we get out of that process, interpretation.

Dewey's initial understanding of the rift between education and social life seemed to be that a society is only effective as its citizens; if that society fails to provide adequate education for the development of its individual citizens, the society as a whole cannot hope to develop. That is, the relationship that exists is one where "individuals are influenced, modified, changed, given shape by the myriad social transactions that comprise any given culture" (Downing 1995, 187). While the project of determining the

role of educative rhetoric *starts* with the individual (as Isocrates does), Dewey's pragmatic rhetoric is needed to reveal the part that education has to play in greater society. This question of what kind of relationship formal education has to everyday life is certainly one that continues to arise for our society today. More often than not, the debate tends to focus on the question of whether education should begin and end with the school or whether learning necessarily continues (at least ideally) throughout one's life. Dewey seems to agree with the latter. As he puts it, "[f]rom the standpoint of the child, the great waste in the school comes from his inability to utilize the experiences he gets outside the school in any complete and free way within the school itself; while, on the other hand, he is unable to apply in daily life what he is learning in school. That is the isolation of the school—its isolation from life" (Dewey 2010, 75). Thus the problem is with *both* the school and society, with advocates for one more often than not trying to downplay the importance of the other.

From the perspective of pragmatic rhetoric, however, to separate the experience of learning in a formal setting from the experience of living out in the world is not only disadvantageous to the citizen, but to society as well. As Scott Stroud writes, "individuals and communities cannot be ontologically separated…The more important claim Dewey is making is that the development of the individual *is* the development of the community, and vice versa" (2011, 71). The greatest problem is trying to find a more effective means of understanding the functional relationship between the educative and the practical, as paralleled by the development of the individual *and* the development of society. According to Dewey, then, "We live in a world where all sides are bound together. All studies grow out of relations in the one great common world. When the child lives in

varied but concrete and active relationship to this common world, his studies are naturally unified…Relate the school to life, and all studies are of necessity correlated" (2010, 91). The first step in reconstructing the relationship between school and society is to realize that "The great masses of people do not live in isolation from one another. They form groups and share interests. They belong to communities, societies, and cultures" (Johnston 2006, 128). But as long as the school does not provide the right kind of learning environment, where individuals learn to communicate and interact with their fellow students, the opportunity for each to grow is severely limited.

EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR FOSTERING COMMUNICATION AND GROWTH

It becomes necessary to specifically address what can go wrong with education as an institution, not simply with the goal of exposing what so clearly does not work, but also with the hope that such an investigation might yield solutions to remaking the educational environment to better relate to and individual's "real world" social environment. First off, in the traditional school system, "Learning here means acquisition of what already is incorporated in books and in the heads of the elders…It is taught as a finished product, with little regard either to the ways in which it was originally built up or to changes that will surely occur in the future" (Dewey 2007, 3). This type of static education is problematic because, in failing to adapt with changing experiences (not to mention changing times), it prohibits growth. Expanded to its wider application in everyday life, a static education can essentially produce static citizens, which in turn hinders the growth of a community.

In this way, the individual can be smothered by institutional education's over-mechanized processes, such as performing rote memorization or sifting through the sheer mass of information that much formal education is required to teach, to the point where students learn disassociated pieces of info, not the process for linking that seemingly disparate information together. This stifles not only personal growth but also any hope for growth that the individual may experience in the future with others. A potential solution, according to John Kosnoski, is that "Dewey claims conversation can motivate participation in the face of such uncertainty and frustration…[and] individuals will undergo greater moral transformation and political growth as they increasingly interpret their seemingly private problems in terms of their public origins and consequences" (2005, 655). Thus, a reassessment of the aims of education is necessary, with respect to the personal predispositions and particular interests already at work defining the student in his or her own mind. The alternative is for students to continue being schooled in a general knowledge of how the world and the goings-on within it supposedly work, with little to no understanding of how to elaborate on their own personal perspectives.

In this way, education should reinforce the means necessary for one's continued growth, in both formal and informal learning environments; but as mentioned earlier, growth is often seen as a process with a set beginning and end. Where formal education seems to fall short is in both *how* and *what* it conditions its students for. Put another way, the kind of environment in which students are educated can clearly have a great impact on how they learn from future environments as future citizens. Johnston explains that, from this point of view, "Environment is recognized as playing a much larger role in cognition. Environments that were once considered of little consequence can now be

shown to have a demonstrative effect upon the interacting individual. Certain environments, for Dewey, lead to further and more satisfying experiences. Important for Dewey is face-to-face contact and communication: the basic tasks of the public" (2006, 128). Thus, teaching students to talk about how they relate to what may seem like their own worlds is a crucial step in teaching them to communicate with others about *their* worlds. Growth implies that as we encounter these differing perspectives, our own first-person perspective evolves. That is, we need to realize that,

> Growth is akin to a natural end for the (human) organism…An individual is said to grow when she undergoes further and further satisfying experiences. What counts as a satisfying experience is none other than the having and augmentation of generic traits. Prior meanings, built up through prior inquiries, lend themselves to the richness and quality of these traits. Not only do many, if not most, of our experiences occur in the presence of others, but our experiences are often shared or informed by others. All of us to some extent have similar doings, sufferings, and undergoings. The realization that this is the case is the beginning of the possibility for control and ordering of experiences through the (public) use of inquiry. As experiences are shared and are amenable to transformation and heightening through inquiry, experiences can be enriched. (Johnston 2006, 138)

While the next section will explore in depth what exactly this inquiry is all about, the take away for now is this: as human beings, we all have experiences and, though they are different, learning to communicate these experiences has the shared general outcome of affecting each other and helping one another to grow. In this way, "To grow is equally to participate in a community where one shares one's experiences with others and has

experiences of others shared, in turn. The means for this sharing is education. To educate is a social activity: it does not and cannot take place outside of the context of other inquirers and communicators" (Johnston 2006, 139).

The result of acknowledging this active place that we hold in the world allows us to "own" our unique perspectives and realize the interactions between ourselves and others in the world more fully based on our individual circumstances. Ultimately, the experiential-encounter becomes a kind of ever-changing means of communication evolving with changes in one's environment. Dewey explains that it then becomes "[a] primary responsibility of educators…[to] not only be aware of the general principle of the shaping of actual experience by environing conditions, but that they also recognize in the concrete what surroundings are conducive to having experiences that lead to growth. Above all, they should know how to utilize the surroundings, physical and social, that exist so as to extract from them all that they have to contribute to building up experiences that are worthwhile" (2007, 25). The danger here is of decontextualizing ourselves, of perhaps falling back into the belief that there is a "right" way of being or learning as dictated by society, or into the belief that, per a negative and misconstrued reading of pragmatism, it is all relative and random—a kind of being that immobilizes the individual citizen as a passive entity. By trying to see the world through our own eyes, a concept that seems simple enough, we may not only be able to better understand our own lives, but realize the impact that our own living has on the lives of others as well.

This strategy translates directly into how teachers ought to think about their jobs as educators. That is, "The teacher's problem is thus twofold. On the one side, he needs…to be a student of individual traits and habits; on the other side, he needs to be a

student of the conditions that modify for better or worse the directions in which individual powers habitually express themselves" (Dewey 2005, 37). Making the most of our own experiences, then, encourages our own growth and, through communication, our ability to help others grow. This only happens when we realize that our experiences do not simply conform to one abstract or objective definition of what an experience *should be*, but rather must be examined individually on the basis of the context in which we (and they) *are*. That is, "[w]hen we say that a person is educated, we do not mean to imply that he has ceased to grow, but rather that he has been educated to the stage at which he can and will take the initiative in the further development of his capacities and interests" (Dewey 1973, 198). It ought to be the aim of education to supply students with the best environment possible in which to grow their minds, while simultaneously preparing them to both affect and be affected by the culture of which they are a part; if students are not provided with a nourishing environment in the relatively controlled context of the classroom, how well can they really be expected to adapt to the "real world" environment that comes later? After all, as Dewey would point out, though the environment may change, both formal education and learning throughout our lives are both part of our experience. As social actors, we have the ability to shape our society, but the quality of that environing society conditions how well we are able to change it.

HABITS NEEDED FOR REFLECTIVE INQUIRY

So far I have shown how communicating, as a unified act of experiences, empowers every individual citizen with a sense of agency. That is, while the act of communication may hold some particular value on its own, that value (and the

communicative act's potentialities for meaning) is only truly realized when the process of interpretation and understanding with and by others begins. The next logical thing to explore is how this process of understanding takes place. The question is what kinds of actions should be secured by the student during his or her growth that will benefit him or her most in continuing that growth in the future. Put another way, the skills we develop should provide us with "the sort of orientation that we ought to adopt to be best ready for growth in our lived experience—one that, like the child, is raptly absorbed in the details of the present, but that, like the driven adult, attends to objects with foresight and connection to the projects and desires we wish to consummate in and through experience" (Stroud 2011, 158). It seems necessary to reconsider those everyday events which we often dismiss as commonplace as, instead, taking on a life of their own, not only as they are commonly experienced, but through the unique meanings with which we infuse and take away from them.

Dewey refers to these particular skills as habits, and they inform how individuals learn to interact with and make sense of their world. He explains that these habits are "a form of executive skill, of efficiency in doing. A habit means an ability to use natural conditions as means to ends. It is an active control of the environment through control of the organs of action" (Dewey 2006, 37). Eventually, enough of these habitual patterns persist that they become customs or laws, common ways of thinking or acting that form the foundational connections of a society. Initially, this may seem to suggest that habits become ruts or beaten paths to which societies become accustomed. These kinds of "bad habits" manifest themselves as barriers to progress or change in the form of the closed mind. Dewey explains that "[p]eople have closed minds for one of three reasons—or

some combination of them. The first of these is prejudice…The second is pride…The third is selfishness…[But] open-mindedness is the antithesis of prejudice, pride, and selfishness; it means accepting all truth even when this means that one's own ideas and preconceptions must be altered or abandoned, or even when this requires that one forego some personal advantage" (1973, 289). Although the word "habit" tends to bring to mind this kind of routinized, negative activity, the skills that pragmatic rhetoric encourages schools to develop in their students are "good habits," habits as they ought to be, always open to change.

When used toward reflective inquiry, we use these good habits to make our decision about the best possible way to act, interpret, or understand a given instance of communication. In a way, the individual's habits come to represent him or herself and vice versa; according to Pappas, "Character is a working interaction of habits. We cannot always come to an accurate assessment of the character of a person from assessing his or her conduct even after a long period of time. However, this is not because character is something "inner" that may or may not externally cause action, but simply because there is no certainty about when our actions are expressions of stable dispositions (habits) and when they are accidental reactions to an undetermined number of contextual factors" (1997b, 449-450). Ideally, then, education should cultivate a certain repertoire of habits in the individual, which he or she can then depend upon and use as tools for negotiating or navigating a given social interaction or communication. When this is not the case, education "inhibits the development of open-mindedness, and nourishes habits of prejudice and dogmatism. One of most common examples of this bad teaching is its requirement of conformity and uniformity, its insistence that all students must comply in

the same way with fixed regulations and all must complete the same assignments. This procedure conduces habits of dogmatism, since students are taught to regard the teacher as the final authority and to parrot his opinions, both in recitation and on examination" (Dewey 1973, 289). In a sense, then, habits parallel the idea of *kairos* introduced in chapter one as an ability to act appropriately in a given situation given a particular set of available resources. That is, we come to an experiential-encounter with certain possible ways of acting and reacting to it that we have acquired from previous experiences. While the resources that an individual has available to incorporate may come from some external locus such as the kind of environment he or she is in at a given time, habits are the internal resources that an individual brings with him or herself to any experience. It is through these tools, through the habits we employ in the act of reflective communication and inquiry, that our perspective can be either broadened or narrowed. This concept of perspective, what we come to develop from our own pasts and individual experiences, is what I believe is the driving force behind what we each get out of our communicative exchanges in particular.

These habits are not always conscious, nor do they necessarily need to be. Although we each essentially pull from our own pool of past experiences, our awareness of drawing on certain habits may impact our present experience in less direct or less obvious ways. Dewey explains that, "There is thus a double movement in all reflection: a movement from the given partial and confused data to a suggested comprehensive (or inclusive) entire situation; and back from this suggested whole—which as suggested is a meaning, an idea—to the particular facts, so as to connect these with one another and with additional facts to which the suggestion has directed attention" (2005, 64). Simply

put, because no particular meaning is emphasized for the individual , that individual pulls from his or her pool of past experiences for making meaning while simultaneously pulling from his or her own potentialities. In this way, the habits taught in education, the very connections one formally learns to make better sense of one's world, both in and outside the classroom, should ideally continue to serve as the basis for the constant development of stronger but more flexible habits throughout one's life.

Whether conscious or not, Dewey explains that the kind of good habits we develop should work toward what he calls reflective inquiry: "Reflection involves not simply a sequence of ideas, but a *con*sequence—a consecutive ordering in such a way that each determines the next as its proper outcome, while each in turn leans back on its predecessors;[must] aim at knowledge, at belief about facts or in truths; [the] acceptance or rejection of something as reasonably probable or improbable; The consequences of a belief upon other beliefs and upon behavior may be so important, then, that men are forced to consider the grounds or reasons of their belief and its logical consequences" (2005, 3-6). Reflective inquiry in education ought to teach individuals how to not only embody what they learn so that they are constantly reflecting on and restructuring their knowledge, but also reveal to those individuals how that reflection works to reshape their ways of making meaning from their experience. What reflective inquiry offers is "the experienced uniqueness of each situation and the reality of change and novelty involved in it. What an experiential approach requires would be different if situations shared more than functional similarity. But in our moral life it is always a specific 'felt' trouble, question, confusion that sets moral inquiry going" (Pappas 1997a , 544).

Formal education should develop these particular skills of thinking or doing in students. While the three Rs of reading, writing, and arithmetic come to mind, these skills are not necessarily the most valuable ones that school can impart to the individual student. Rather, Dewey suggests that it is the business of education "to cultivate deep-seated and effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses, and opinions; to develop a lively, sincere and open-minded preference for conclusions that are properly grounded, and to ingrain into the individual's working habits methods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate to the various problems that present themselves" (2005, 23). These skills certainly may serve the individual in formal education, but have at least as much, if not *more*, value for the rest of his or her life. In particular, these habits can be used to make one's everyday experiences more reflective, which Stroud defines as "not just [being] absorbed in the immediate qualities presented, but [also reflecting] on the meaning of those qualities *as connected to other events, qualities, or states of affairs*. The reflective activity gives one added meaning and allows one to order or instate values in one's experience" (2011, 54). However, this is not to suggest that one's experience should *always* be reflective; rather, reflective inquiry enables our ability to adapt when certain significant experiences arise, allowing us to have more meaningful reactions to and interactions with those experiences. Habits like these lay the groundwork for how the individual as a citizen is able to make the most of associated living. The idea of the reflecting citizen entails an individual who is continually defining and being defined by the experiences that he or she is living out. It is through learning to communicate this experience, through reflective inquiry, that the reshaping of self and experience takes on

a very real quality in the world. . Thus, the act of communication is seen as a place of work where reflecting subjects learn to connect through their experiential-encounters.

THE SCHOOL, SOCIETY, AND MELIORISM

Pragmatic rhetoric helps resolve the isolation of school from society with respect to the ends and means we ascribe to the value and purpose of education not merely in the classroom, but in all our social interactions. We tend to see the school and society as fundamentally separate; the former a kind of intellectual penance that everyone must endure before becoming a full-fledged citizen entering into the latter "real world." The problem here is that, at best, the individual develops only personal motivations, or ends, for acting in that world. The result is using one's habits or even others as mere tools to achieve some temporary, fleeting desire. That is, formal schooling alone can create "[o]rientations that render communication as incomplete, fragmented, and less effective at building community are those orientations that tend to separate means/ends and process/product in communication and that tend to make the value of the means (in this case, interacting with others) depend solely on the value of the end that one desires" (Stroud 2008, 179). The main problem here is that the experiences that the individual encounters through various classes and other interactions in school are often seen as self-contained, without any worthwhile bearing on the individual's experience after he or she leaves formal schooling.

The default end of learning seems to suggest students fulfilling some kind of curricular exercise, whether it is passing a test, writing a paper, or getting good grades. But as Dewey points out, "judging an educational experiment by the pupil's ability to

'keep up' with the system the experiment is trying to improve, is of very little value. The purpose…is rather to give the child an education which will make him a better, happier, more efficient human being, by showing him what his capabilities are and how he an exercise them, both materially and socially, in the world he finds about him" (1915, 58). While high marks on these various assignments may have positive ramifications within the school itself, they are hollow rewards that choke off the true value of the student's learning: that is, to form a foundation from which he or she continues to build up and shape his or her encounters in various communicative interactions for the rest of his or her life. Or, as Biesta puts it, "In the case of education…we not only need to ask whether our educational activities, strategies, and — if one wishes to use the word — interventions are desirable in themselves; we also always need to ask what are the educational effects of our actions" (1997, 9). Along these lines, Dewey suggests the following about how to link school and society as ends *and* means to one another:

> [T]he end of education is not just the cultivation of scholars or bookworms who are satisfied to spend all their time reading, but rather it is to cultivate useful members of society. Ability to read is not enough to make a good citizen, if by good citizen we mean one who must make [a] real contribution to his society…First, the school must make students want to fulfill their duties to society…Second, the school must acquaint students with the nature of social life…And third, the school should not merely acquaint students with the needs of society, but must also prepare them to meet these needs. (1973, 211)

But what kind of responsibility is implied here in the relationship between the individual and society? Fortunately, an answer lies in how we approach our habits as means to ends that go beyond our personal satisfaction.

Reflective inquiry helps individuals to see that they are part of a bigger picture by linking experiences in the present with more removed experiences in the past or future. What's more, those individuals begin to understand that the other pieces that make up that bigger picture are a part of who they are. But for pragmatic rhetoric, simply realizing these interconnections is not enough; something must be done with that knowledge. While habits of inquiry can certainly useful to the individual as ends in their own right, we need to ask if these habits might be even *more* useful as means to some ends for greater society. Pappas offers a suggestion here, writing that, "For Dewey acts are not contextless events or mere external effects of a self. In fact for Dewey moral conduct is an expression of the moral self" (1997b, 461). The next step is to ask, if our habits are indeed moral expressions of self: Is there some way that the expression of the habits of all citizens is found in the moral expression of a society? Pappas explains further that, for Dewey, "there are at least three reasons why moral conduct is an expression of the moral self: (1) because moral conduct is an expression of intention, (2) because moral conduct reveals acquired character, and (3) because in some fundamental ontological sense what 'I do' is what 'I am'" (1997b, 464). One's habits, then, become how one sees, and is seen by, the society of which one is a part. This is not to say that a moral focus inherently or instantaneously makes a society "good" or "bad"; the key here is to suggest that, through their habits of reflective inquiry, individuals not only have the ability to better themselves, but also to better their society. This perspective is known as meliorism, and

can be defined as the bettering "of one's experience by intelligently adjusting one's deep-seated orientations toward self, others, and the value of an activity" (Stroud 2011, 9).

In order to really learn the most we can from our communication with others, it is necessary to understand not only how we are affected by or how we affect certain habits, but also what the consequences of these habits can mean for affecting change in society. This is one place in particular where Dewey fills in an important gap left by Isocrates: while Isocrates focused on natural, personal ability in the individual, Dewey takes that notion a step further by suggesting that personal and social ability are integrally linked. As we become more aware of our various personal habits, both conscious and unconscious, those habits become plastic. If habits are the resources developed by formal education that we can deploy in a given instance of communication, it becomes apparent that these habits contribute to a greater understanding of how exactly that communication can be drawn upon in order to enact melioristic change within a community. Ideally, our interactions in society reflect "a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity" (Dewey 2006, 69). The reason for pursuing educational experiences beyond the school is that the individual will both be able to learn from and contribute to ways of meliorating this associated living. Put another way, although students will continue to have experiential-encounters regardless of the intervention of formal education, it makes sense to use the time spent in school to establish enduring

good habits. After all, the students will ideally continue to refine these habits on their own within the framework that the school has established.

Both the Deweyean and Isocratean approaches to education shy away from learning as mere individual acquisition of information, focusing instead on how that learning translates into skills or abilities which the individual can continue to use and consequently improve upon throughout his or her life. The rhetorical significance is that the notion of improvement connotes a sense of bettering oneself, which I argue is an essential point to bridging the gap between personal and societal experience by approaching learning through a moral lens. Not only does analyzing education through the lens of morality provide the individual with a sense of self amidst a greater community of individuals, it also provides a reason for that society to encourage its individuals to better themselves; to put it simply, what is good for one is good for the other. Along those lines, Dewey writes that

> Moral education has deep and pervasive implications, especially when we look at it from the point of view of the philosophical problem of the relationship of the individual and society. The difference between education that is moral and that which is not lies in the fact that in the former the knowledge, the ability, and the emotion of the individual are emphasized at the same time that they are directed to the development of social sympathy. Thus the main problem of moral education is to develop individuality in such ways as will enhance the individual's social sympathy, as will dispose him to subordinate his own advantage to the interests of social welfare, and as will develop a feeling of identification with and loyalty to the society of which he is a member. (1973, 298)

Understood with this moral focus in mind, the purpose of education shifts; rather than learning isolated topics, the individual's education starts with relationships. Education then becomes a matter of how to best understand (and later on, engage with) social life. The kind of "social sympathy" to which Dewey refers reveals *why* pursuing learning beyond the four walls of the classroom is worthwhile, as well as providing an entry point into making sense of *how* that learning is rhetorical. Put another way, social sympathy can be understood as a kind of world-building activity that takes place between the individual self and society. As Biesta puts it, "when individuals act together in order to achieve a common goal, they need to adjust their individual approaches, their individual perspectives and patterns of action in such a way that a coordinated response becomes possible. In this process their individual worlds are transformed. These worlds do not become identical, but what does happen, Dewey argued, is that the partners in interaction create a shared, *intersubjective*, world. They make, in other words, 'something in common'—and it is for precisely this reason that Dewey referred to this process as *communication*" (1994, 12).

The goal then becomes one of working toward the best kind of communication practices possible, both for ourselves and for our common society. Stroud notes that, "Meliorism helps here as well by suggesting how we ought to communicate, how meaning-making goes wrong in particular circumstances, and ways to change communal situations of discourse" (2010, 51). Thus, the aim of education must be "to create good citizens. A more detailed way of saying the same thing is to say that education must enable every individual both to benefit from the past and present culture of his society, and to contribute to the development of the emerging culture by initiating new

experiences of his own which may influence others to participate in new kinds of social action" (Dewey 1973, 210). It is not enough for students to learn solely about abstract experience from the past, but instead to learn to connect that knowledge to their personal experience in the present. The critical point that emerges here is "the conception that education is a constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience. It has all the time an immediate end, and so far as activity is educative, it reaches that end—the direct transformation of the quality of experience" (Dewey 2006, 61). Education no longer becomes about *what* to know for one's personal advantage, but rather always modifying what one can do through *how* one knows and employs that knowledge in one's interactions with others. Ultimately, the community is imbued with life from the myriad experiences of all those individuals who make it up, implicating those citizens in the creation and interpretation of society. Communication becomes a tool for not only consuming the world, but also a means of producing totally new ways of perceiving and (re)creating that world. When communication is used in such a way as to achieve something new in social experience, it breaks free of its culturally assigned role of merely transmitting information; it becomes a means of not just reproduction but of creation.

CONCLUSION

Pragmatic rhetoric serves to establish the second phase of this two-part program for bringing about change in education. It demonstrates the value of the experiences developed in formal schooling to the experiences had by an individual after he or she finds him or herself as part of a greater society. As Dewey puts it, "[t]o 'learn from experience' is to make a backward and forward connection between what we do to things

and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. Under such conditions, doing becomes a trying; an experiment with the world to find out what it is like; the undergoing becomes instruction—discovery of the connection of things" (2006, 112). It is this continued experimentation and discovery that education needs to strive for. While Isocrates and Dewey demonstrate why change in education benefits both formal schooling and society at large, it is now necessary to explore what that innovation could look like. To this end, in the following chapter I introduce the idea of "inhabited learning" as a kind of educational experience that encourages individuals to reflect on the knowledge they acquire both from the classroom and their everyday lived experience, and how that knowledge redefines their capabilities as social innovators.

Chapter 3: Realizing Inhabited Learning through Rhetorical Invention

We now come to the final chapter of this project: what, in fact, we can expect from the individual (and what he or she can expect from him or herself) who continues to master educative and pragmatic rhetoric. I previously mentioned that these concepts are two sides of the same coin; now, it is time to determine what exactly that coin is worth. Isocrates and Dewey essentially represent two ends of the same spectrum with a gap in between them. This chapter attempts to fill in that gap. If one follows the path laid out in the two previous chapters, a common theme should emerge: as human beings, our best and most original thinking happens in concert with others. While this is not to say that forced collaboration should automatically be preferred to isolation, what *is* being said here is that the opportunities for enacting what we know in creative ways flourish when our ideas bump up against others through communication. The outcome of such an intermixing of knowledge and activity is typically referred to as innovation or invention; the former tends to connote a rehashing or restructuring of some previously known ideas, while the latter tends to connote bringing new ideas into existence. However, although this distinction can be made, I will use the terms of innovation and invention interchangeably, since the "products" of both can be equally valuable. In addition, *rhetorical invention* is considered one of the five major canons of rhetoric as a discipline, and primarily concerns itself with the creation and use of meanings and argument. Rhetorical invention thus requires a degree of *kairos*, a common theme for both Isocrates and Dewey, which can have a profound effect on one's ability to invent.

This final chapter will be divided into three main sections. The first section explores the conditions necessary for invention. The second section addresses attempts to define the nature of invention itself. The third and final section is concerned with defining the concept of inhabited learning. Along the way, the lines between the knowledge we acquire (theory) and what we do with that knowledge (practice) will continue to blur. When one reaches the point where these concepts are understood as mutually dependent and uses that reflection to inform how and what changes one "thinks up," inhabited learning has been achieved. Inhabited learning is concerned with formal education for lifelong learning and explores why, even with Dewey's and Isocrates' thought in mind, our learning experiences still do not seem to be happening as they ought to be. And so, I propose that inhabited learning bridges the work of these two thinkers in a way that gets at what might have been left out of the equation for better education. From a rhetorical point of view, this includes practices such as teaching students to understand the power of persuasive language, rather than using persuasion or coercion to somehow force students "to learn." The former practice empowers students with the strength needed for innovative thinking by making people aware of the learning environment that they inhabit. Inhabited learning serves as my umbrella term for all of the processes and interactions discussed thus far, and it will be the primary focus of the third and final section of this chapter. First, however, it is necessary to explore the very conditions required to make invention possible.

CONDITIONS FOR INVENTION

Like the individual, rhetorical invention requires a particular kind of environment in order to flourish. This point can also be related back to the academy, with regard to whether or not the atmosphere that the school provides is amenable to both helping individuals grow and think "outside the box." Unfortunately, in school and in life, possible ideas tend to get boiled down to two or three polarizing points of view. This is the closed-mindedness to which Dewey refers in the previous chapter. A great deal of effort needs to be put into trying to understand the conditions that need to be in place in order to reconcile these polarizing viewpoints in a way that can retain the best of both worlds. To the end of mitigating these often polarizing conflicts, Karen Burke LeFevre takes the following approach: if everything boils down to these opposing points of view, what is typically referred to as dialectic, we should concern ourselves with whether or not a middle road can be found between them. These polarizing persepctives most often present themselves in everyday social situations that require an agile, reflective mind to negotiate and meliorate them.

LeFevre starts with the basic premise that correlates the value of reaching a common understanding or meaning with the context in which that meaning is derived. To put it simply, what makes the best meaning is its usefulness to a given situation. As Dewey showed, meaning making comes about through our communication with others, and LeFevre seems to agree. She writes that "[o]ne invents in part because of others, because one thinks fruitfully in the company of a great many others, who are both possible and real" (1987, 93). We need this kind of collaboration to begin to get our own ideas off the ground. Along with a general disposition for satisfying our curiosity, we as

human beings can also be notoriously closed-minded (as mentioned above). LeFevre's answer is that another goal of collaboration is shaking us out of how enamored we are with our own genius. That is, talking with others "helps to show a perspective of invention that takes the invention process out of the mind of the individual and into the interaction of real people" (LeFevre 1987, 62). This way, good ideas are pushed out into the light for all to consider; decent ideas can only be made better by that same process.

For LeFevre, then, what makes invention *rhetorical* is that it is a social act. As she puts it, "Invention is *active* in the sense that according to contemporary definitions, invention is increasingly regarded as the act of creating something, not only as the act of retrieving and rendering what was previously known. And invention is *social* in that even while it occurs in an individual, it is heavily influenced by that individual's relationship to others through the social entity of language as well as through social structures, forms, purposes, and practices" (1987, 119-120). While this is certainly reminiscent of the role that reflective inquiry can play in communication, insofar as better ideas are encouraged in individuals who are aware of the influence of where those ideas originated, rhetorical invention also retains a melioristic quality**.** While having bigger or brighter ideas is certainly a valuable end in itself, LeFevre explains that this kind of collaboration "is also a way of insuring that people are involved in the process of inventing so that they have a stake in the outcome" (1987, 75). Thus, the new social bonds forged through rhetorical invention become just as important as the new ideas that might be generated.

Roy Wagner takes a similar "social" approach to rhetorical invention. For Wagner, there is something fundamentally human about the process of invention and how it is linked to the cultures that we create. Like the concept of associated living from

chapter two, Wagner suggests that our source of creative genius comes out of our contact with one another. The difference for Wagner is that he believes that we as human beings have become blind to our own creativity capacity. He writes that "[b]y assuming that we merely measure, predict, or harness this world of situations, individuals, and forces, we mask the fact that we create it" (1981, 71). This notion also echoes the rhetorical point made by Isocrates that, through language, we create our world. In our eagerness to determine the "fixed" values or truths that seemingly define our culture, then, we often overlook the ability of our own actions to shape that culture.

Wagner continues to echo LeFevre in explaining that one person's good idea in fact does very little "good" if it remains isolated. As he puts it, "It is elemental to a definition of man that he continually invests his ideas, seeking external equivalents that not only articulate them, but also subtly change them in the process, until often these meanings take on a life of their own, and possess their authors" (1981, 34). So, in one respect, rhetorical invention becomes a way of helping us realize how our ideas grow, or even what got them growing in the first place. But in another respect, rhetorical invention reveals something about our own personal growth as well. According to Wagner, "In our living with these toys, tools, articles, and heirlooms, desiring them, treasuring them, we admit into our personalities the whole range of values, attitudes, and sentiments—indeed the creativity of those who invented them, used them, know and desire them, or gave them to us. In learning to use tools we are secretly learning to use ourselves" (1981, 76-77). The environmental conditions that rhetorical invention requires in order to flourish, then, are very similar to those conditions needed for the individual to become a reflective citizen; in fact, the two seem to be inextricably linked. Assuming

those ideal environing conditions are met, it now becomes a matter of determining what actually takes place when individuals and cultures come together in the political forum, school, or coffee house conversation.

THE NATURE OF INVENTION

While the kinds of conditions discussed above may work significantly toward triggering an instance of rhetorical invention, it is necessary to explore what really takes place in that "aha!" moment. To do so first requires realizing that there is not just one type or kind of invention; though earth-shattering discoveries tend to come to mind first and foremost, invention also includes the nuances and refinements of preexisting ideas. This was suggested above with the brief reference to dialectic: when two opposing forces come together, the product of the conflict is to discover a kind of middle-ground. John Muckelbauer takes this notion as his starting point.

Muckelbauer's primary concern is this: if we are constantly trying to work our way out of various dialectics, are we actually achieving any real progress or change? Perhaps surprisingly, Muckelbauer suggests that, while the solution or change might be real, it can never fully remove itself from the original composition of the dialectic. He explains that there are three typical approaches used when faced with dialectic:

(1) In this first style of engagement, one emphasizes a traditionally privileged concept and negates its traditionally underprivileged counterpart. (2008, 6)

(2) The second response flips the dialectical coin and privileges the underdog. (2008, 7)

(3) This third response recognizes the ethical and political dangers associated with taking either side in this interminable confrontation. Not wanting to become engaged in the movement of negation that engineers both positions, it attempts to overcome the oppositional movement itself by synthesizing these opposing poles (2008, 8)

Even though the third option seems to be the "right answer" for many rhetoricians, it leaves Muckelbauer dissatisfied because it still remains within the original confines of the dialectic. His alternative is to examine the situation in which the dialectic develops with the hope that the context will furnish some kind of solution. That is, "If rhetoric is fundamentally an art of contingency and context and if things like truth and knowledge are dependent on actual situations and actual audiences, it becomes crucial to determine what a situation or an audience actually is, what its key components are and how it works in practice (Muckelbauer 2008, 24). This mirrors both Isocrates' and Dewey's emphasis that all understanding begins with a particular experience.

According to Muckelbauer, then, the outcome for how we redefine invention based on this model is essentially in terms of a shift on a spectrum: at one end lies what is akin to the rhetoric of probabilities, while the rhetoric of possibilities lie at the other end. The shift that occurs moves the nature and consequent function of rhetorical invention closer to that latter point, to the realm of what might be possible. Even though this shift doesn't seem to get us out of the original problem with the dialectic, it may still be enough to shift our perspective and examine these dialectical repetitions through an inventive point of view.

Steven Johnson also starts from the dialectical point as the place where invention begins. However, like LeFevre, he is more concerned with the opposing forces within the dialectic, how they literally come together and oftentimes collide. Thus, although Johnson does not seem to see different ideas or perspectives as inherently interconnected through the dialectic, connection does result from very disparate ideas being forcefully thrown together. The take away is that *we* can often decide what ideas we want to throw together in the first place. This is akin to searching out *ideai* for Isocrates, where the individual's learning is tantamount to uncovering which ideas or perspectives of seeing the world stick with him or her. Johnson writes that, "innovative environments are better at helping their inhabitants explore the adjacent possible, because they expose a wide and diverse sample of spare parts—mechanical or conceptual—and they encourage novel ways of recombining those parts (2010, 41). In a sense, then, while we've already discussed the kind of environments that make invention possible, Johnson seems to imply that the moment of invention itself supplies a kind of environment.

So what exactly is the point of all this? Why does rhetorical invention matter? Well, if what Johnson describes is a useful way of thinking about invention (and I believe it is), it suggests that when the conditions are right, the creative learning process resonates throughout every fiber of society, from the community down through the individual down to his or her very being, which predisposes him or her to think in particular ways. While this kind of creative learning can certainly happen to varying degrees, what is essential here is that the conditions are in place so that creative learning has a *better* chance of taking place. Put another way, Dewey might suggest that although we need not be in a constant state of reflective inquiry, what *is* required is that we find or

create an environment that allows inquiry to be effective when we do need it. The real trick, however, is looping this process, where what the individual comes up with is seen as valuable to the degree that, ideally, it works itself back up the chain of social interaction. The particular take away that Johnson seems to have for us is this: "The story here is not the old chestnut of living in a connected age where information flows more quickly than ever before. The information is not simply flowing in this system; it's being recycled and put to new uses, transformed by a diverse network of other species in the ecosystem, each with its own distinct function" (2010, 208). Realizing that all of our experiences as human beings are somehow linked, to the degree that putting our heads together makes us more effective problem solvers, innovators and community builders, seems to be what Isocrates, Dewey, and rhetorical invention are all about. And this realization is what I refer to as inhabited learning.

INHABITED LEARNING AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE

For this project, I have shown that learning should be understood as a "good," defined here as something desirable that has beneficial effects for individuals and societies alike. What is more, I have also shown that through such an understanding, the learned skills of the individual can be put to good use in bettering his or her society. But to define learning in such a way begs the following question: Despite the great emphasis that many societies put on the value of learning, why do our educational institutions often fail to live up to their responsibility? Granted, this is not to say that learning should be *the same* for everyone, since not everyone learns in "the" same way. What matters, though, is *how* people can find the opportunities to become better learners and

consequently better citizens. At the very least, inhabited learning can help people make better qualitative connections with the information with which they are presented and with which they identify in their everyday lives; at most, inhabited learning is about instilling and cultivating a natural drive to learn in individuals that far exceeds any expectation of confining learning to the period of formal education in one's life; in fact, I believe that inhabited learning can enhance the formal learning experience as well.

This project has come a long way in redefining rhetoric and education as having a practically-oriented purpose. Through its emphasis on individual ability, interdisciplinarity of thought, and the merging of a creatively adaptive pedagogy with everyday experience, inhabited learning seems to establish a new way of approaching the relationship between rhetoric and education. This type of education highly values the influence and impact of what one learns in school to one's everyday life and vice versa, with one naturally informing the other. Inhabited learning can be contrasted with learning that is inhibited, or education as it more often than not tends to be practiced today. Disciplinary isolation, one-sidedness in academic argument, and inability or unwillingness to connect what goes on in the classroom with the rest of the world outside can all contribute to inhibiting the educational experience of both the student and the teacher. If Isocrates and Dewey are correct in suggesting that we are, in fact, judged based on the habits that each of us chooses to enact in our everyday lives, it becomes imperative that we learn the best habits possible. And those habits must be encouraged through education.

Inhabited learning can thus be said to have three main goals. The first two goals concern the role and significance of the individual and the community, respectively,

while the third goal addresses the double identity that an individual may develop as both a particular "self" and as a citizen. Inhabited learning thus involves an education through which what is learned becomes a part of the individual and a part of how they interact with others. Within the academy more particularly, the individual scholar's advantage of knowledge needs to be translated to the advantage of all, still including him or herself but also shared with his or her students, colleagues inside or outside the department, and the greater academic community. Essentially, inhabited learning posits that what is good for the one needs to be as good as it can be for as many others as possible. From another academic perspective, the goal of education itself is to demonstrate these best practices for thinking and acting to the student, mirroring Isocrates' own emphasis on declamation; in this way, teachers become another potential source of inspiration for the student to draw upon. And so, even the more individualized aspects of inhabited learning concern themsevles with channeling multiple personalities and perspectives.

The second goal of inhabited learning deals more explicitly with how one interacts with others. Specifically, this side of inhabited learning reflects the critical importance of communication to the success of education. In this instance, effective communication is defined as one's ability to meet others on their terms. As Schiappa puts it, "[i]f…my goal is *empathy*—that is, if I try to understand who that person is from the 'inside out'—then not only will I treat her more ethically, as a full human being and not just by *mere* difference, I will also learn and grow as a person myself" (1995, 40). In this way, the significance of the communicative act lies not in how well one argues one's point or whether or not one speaks persuasively, but in one's ability to maintain a

receptive mind to open discourse. From a communication perspective, inhabited learning is about becoming a more effective participant and discussant.

The third goal deals with the double identity that seems to be needed in order to actually carry Isocrates' teachings into Dewey's pragmatic practice. The student of rhetoric must learn to maintain an identity as both an individual self and as a citizen, which, while he or she may sometimes come under scrutiny for leaning too much one way or the other, is an overall positive endeavor. Instead of connoting some kind of schizophrenia in the mind of the individual that cannot be reconciled between the public and private spheres of life, the double or perhaps multiple identities advocated by inhabited learning are needed to do just that: bridge the gap between education's ivory tower and the greater public forum. This identity is specifically inspired by and constructed from the various perspectives that one has encountered and learned from; one's training teaches one when certain identities are more appropriate, emphasizing *kairos* as another critical component of inhabited learning.

This double identity also has ramifications for teaching as a profession. Since the goal of learning is to encourage the intellect and morals of students, education itself must be tied to a sense of moral duty. That is not to say that education should take on the moral onus of a religion or, perhaps today, a political party, but rather that education across the board often sells itself short; without taking on this extra responsibility, it cannot hope to reap the rewards of producing well-informed citizens who can think for themselves. Robert Hariman writes that this kind of education "becomes a profession in the ethical sense of that term, in order that it can model the appropriate character for all public

practices. This character is developed in part by learning how to speak in the many distinctive voices that make up the city as a whole, past and present" (2004, 230).

So what exactly is inhabited learning all about? Inhabited learning is fundamentally about the story told from one's life experiences, formed by what can now be understood as the incredibly complex interweaving of connections and associations found in one's everyday life. In an age where we have seemingly unlimited information brought to us almost instantaneously, it no longer suffices for education to serve individuals as but another isolated source of information. Rather, a *rhetorical* education should be a source of confluence for individuals, with an eye to the socially demarcated "time in school" as an opportunity to catalyze an individual's learning experience. Rhetorical education can accomplish this goal by helping that individual learn the theories *and* practices that will enable him or her to become a more effective citizen; perhaps it may even be the first step toward a more socially aware and critically conscious society. But it all starts with a way of teaching individuals, as lifelong students of a shared human experience, how to immerse themselves in what they learn so that stronger attractions are made with the ideas, opinions, and arguments which they encounter in their everyday lives and which come to define the type of citizen that student will become.

CONCLUSION

Education has always been touted as a kind of investment in students as the future of society. Yet today, that investment has been corrupted by the demands of literal investments in education through the manipulation of the goals and perspectives of higher

learning by outside interests. The great irony is that those interests that can afford to help improve education are bending their resources toward turning learning on its head. Education has always provided a kind of safe haven for investigating and sharing new ideas, and it is my belief that it serves society best in that capacity. Thus, it has been the goal of this thesis to present a reasonable case for not just maintaining formal education as a vital social institution, but also to elaborate on the ways that education can become a more fulfilling social experience.

It is the responsibility of rhetoric to make this experience a reality. If providing the best possible conditions for education still may not encourage individuals to pursue learning on their own, what can be done? If the purpose of education is to make people more involved with their own, personal learning, then education needs to be concerned with *how* students are learning rather than *what* they are being taught. Put another way, education need not focus on content so much as the skills for reflective inquiry that can make any learning experience so much more valuable. This means teaching students how to think about, talk about, and engage with the content that now lies literally at their fingertips. After all, a great deal of the information that teachers used to bring to students is now available in their habitable world, so education needs to teach those students how to manipulate that information in order to make sense of it for themselves. The alternative is for individuals to have their minds made up for them by the veiled interests or perspectives that may push that information on them.

Applied in this way, rhetoric can set us on the right track toward a better method of enabling people to become lifelong learners. The first, crucial step lies with formal education and making individuals want to step into that learning environment. In taking

that first step, in beginning with those students, the benefits of an education structured through inhabited learning can radiate from the individual to the rest of society. But it all starts with one person. So often we spend our time struggling alone trying to find answers to questions that were asked years and years ago; other times we get so focused on answering our contemporaries' questions that we forget to ask our own. The consequence is that we get caught in a vicious circle without making any real progress in finding a solution to the very questions that we chased down the rabbit hole in the first place. Adopting a rhetorical perspective allows us to look at what has come before us in order to engage the past with the hope of finding, at the very least, some foundation from which we can begin to redefine our present.

Inhabited learning thus provides a means for us to rethink how we organize and value education, both within academia and without. Interestingly enough, one may suggest that the future of learning lies in constantly renegotiating the meaning and subsequent purpose of learning in the past for the sake of the present. This thesis shows that even great thinkers removed from us in time and space are still great; they can still cast light on modern topics in new and unfamiliar ways, encouraging different and even multiple perspectives. Inhabited learning, then, demonstrates how, while the form of education may be and perhaps needs to be ever-changing to meet new concerns for new ages, the goal remains the same: develop the habits of the good and thinking citizen in students toward the end of creating a society that is more reflective in its thought.

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